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ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit considered four antitrust appeals during the period
covered by this survey. All four cases reached the court on appeal from defendants' successful motions for summary judgment. Three of the cases are
routine in their application of well-established legal principles and will be
examined briefly in this overview; the final case is of much greater import
and will be discussed at length in the comment that follows.
I.

FARNELL V. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY

Farnell, a former employee of the publishing company, brought this action under the Sherman' and Clayton Acts. 2 He sought recovery of treble
damages for alleged antitrust injuries. The trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. 3 At issue was plaintiff's standing to sue. Farnell had been employed as a district manager
whose duties were performed in the company's circulation department. In
addition to his employment, in the capacity of an independent contractor,
he operated several vending machines that sold single copies of the company's newspaper. The company discontinued its dealings with independent
contractors, and on several occasions requested that Farnell cease his outside
operations. He refused and was eventually terminated for this and other
allegedly insubordinate conduct. Subsequently, he brought this action, alleging that his termination and the discontinuation of his single-copy sales
4
activities were the result of antitrust violations by his former employer.
Affirming the summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit applied a twopronged test to determine whether plaintiff had standing to sue. The court
found that the first requirement was met, in that plaintiff was injured in his
business or property. However, the court found that he failed to meet the
second requirement, in that he could show no connection between his alleged injuries and any violation of the antitrust laws. 5
II.

FITZGERALD V. GENERAL DAIRIES, INC.

In Fitzgerald, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 6 At issue was whether the statute of limitations had run on the incidents and events providing the basis for
the action. Viewing the matter as a small series of isolated events, the dis1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 15 (1976).

3. Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978).
4. Id. at 500.
5. Id. at 501.

6. Fitzgerald v. General Dairies, Inc., 590 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1979).
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trict court found that the statute had run, and plaintiff was barred from
recovery.
However, because the plaintiff had alleged a continuing conspiracy, the
Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the matter for trial. 7 Quite properly,
the court recognized that prevention of reentry into the market is evidence of
a continuing comspiracy. 8 Plaintiff had been a competitor of the defendants
until he was forced to file for bankruptcy. He claimed that were it not for
the defendants' conspiracy to keep him out, he might have reentered the market. The court found that plaintiff had raised sufficient issues to justify the
granting of a trial.
III.

NATRONA SERVICE, INC. V. CONTINENTAL OIL Co.

Plaintiff, Natrona Service, appealed the granting of summary judgment
to defendants, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff had
failed to show, after extensive discovery proceedings, that any valid cause of
action existed.9
It is interesting to note that plaintiff, an oil exploration service, had
enjoyed a market position amounting to a monopoly for many years. This is
evidenced by the fact that it was able to raise its prices twenty-five per cent
without losing a customer.' 0 The court noted that Natrona was really seeking damages for profits it would have made had it not lost its monopoly on
the claim staking and validation business in Wyoming. As the court succinctly stated, "Anti-trust laws have been enacted for the protection and
preservation of competition, not for the protection of competitors."'I
IV.

A JURISDICTIONAL BARRIER TO TIlE PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIOm
MAC ADJUSTMENT, INC. v. GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,

INC.

A.

Introduction

Because the boycott, a concerted refusal by some traders to deal with
other traders,12 is a particularly malignant form of antitrust injury, the law
has created a series of exceptions which enable the courts to deal swiftly and
effectively with the problem. Mac Adjustment, Inc. o. Gentral Adjustment Bureau,
Inc. 1 3 clearly illustrates the problems created when a court fails to recognize
the exceptions and attempts to apply the general law of antitrust to a specific
problem.
Mac, an independent insurance adjusting service, and its owner were
allegedly put out of business as a direct result of defendant's actions. Acting
in concert, the defendants apparently were successful in their attempts to
persuade Mac's clients to use another adjuster. Defendants purportedly rep7.
8.
9.
10.
It.
12.
13.

Id.at 876.
Id.
Natrona Service, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 598 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 1297-98.
Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
597 F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1979).
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resented that Mac was too generous in adjusting claims. After his business
had dwindled to almost nothing, Mac brought this action.
Both the trial court and the Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that the
private plaintiff who is injured by a boycott is not required to show that he is
engaged in interstate commerce, or that such commerce has in fact been
substantially affected by the alleged injury.14 The Tenth Circuit's decision
was further complicated by the court's attempt to reconcile its finding that
Mac was not within the "business of insurance" as it is defined by the McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 with its conception of the requirements of the Sherman Act.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for further determination of whether Mac was carrying on business in interstate commerce. 16 Before the matter reached trial, defendants petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari.
B.

The Background
1. The Sherman Act

The private plaintiff who sought redress under the Sherman Act' 7 had
first to prove a resulting public injury in order to establish the court's jurisdiction in the matter. In 1911, the Supreme Court voiced the requirement
that the proscribed acts must be of "such a character as to give rise to the
inference or presumption that they had been entered into or done with the
intent to do wrong to the general public.""' The effect of this requirement
was to preclude recovery by small businesses because their injuries could not
be sufficiently large so as to affect the economy, despite the magnitude of the
effect on the business itself.
Standard Ol119 also established the "rule of reason" as the standard the
Court would use exclusively for the next seventeen years in antitrust litigation. Under this rule, if an arrangement such as price-fixing was reasonable,
the Court would find no antitrust violation.
The doctrine of per se illegality was first used in UnitedStates v. Trenton
Potteries Co. ,20 to declare illegal a price-fixing arrangement, despite its "reasonableness." Under this doctrine, certain restraints would be held illegal in
themselves, regardless of whether the complainant could show a resulting
public injury.
The group boycott was held to be per se illegal in Klor's v.Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc. 21 Klor's was a small retail appliance store, one of many such
14. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20 § 2, 59 Stat.

34).
16. 597 F.2d at 1323.

17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
18. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).

19. Id. at 62.
20. 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927).
21. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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dealers in the San Francisco area. Defendant Broadway-Hale, a large department store chain, operated a store next door to that of Klor's. Both
stores competed in the sale of household appliances.
Klor's alleged that, in an attempt to handicap its ability to effectively
compete, defendant Broadway-Hale and ten appliance manufacturers and
distributors who were also named as defendants, conspired among themselves to ensure that the manufacturers and distributors would either refuse
to sell to Klor's, or to sell to it only at discriminatory prices and unfavorable
terms.2 2 Broadway-Hale was able to use its "monopolistic buying power" to
bring about this result, 23 and at the time Klor's brought suit this had already
'24
resulted in "a great loss of profits, goodwill, reputation and prestige."
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the dispute was nothing more
than a "purely private quarrel" 25 which failed to amount to a public wrong
proscribed by the Sherman Act.
In reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized that a boycott "is not to be
tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so
'
small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy. "26
Klor's business was entirely intrastate in character. The Supreme Court
determined that because the manufacturing, distributing and selling of
household appliances was within interstate commerce, Klor's had established the requisite jurisdiction. Under these guidelines, Mac would appear
to be able to satisfy the interstate commerce requirements of the Sherman
Act.
The basic premise of Klor's has been applied by the Supreme Court in a
27
situation where the complainant's business is almost entirely intrastate,
which is analogous to the Mac situation. And, the Supreme Court recently
relied on Klor's in a decision 28 involving the boycott exception to the McCar29
ran-Ferguson Act.

Regardless of whether Mac was found to be within the business of insurance, reliance by the Tenth Circuit on Klor's would have produced the correct solution to the enigma that the Mac case creates. The Tenth Circuit, by
equating involvement in interstate commerce with the business of insurance,
precluded Mac's recovery unless it could prove that it was indeed engaged in
interstate commerce. This holding therefore compels further examination of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as well as resulting case law.
2.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act

When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, the question as to whether
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 210.
Id. at 213.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).

29. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
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the sale of insurance was a transaction in interstate commerce was already
well-settled. In fact, the Supreme Court, on four previous occasions, 30 had
held such sales not to constitute commerce at all. It was not until 1943 that
the Court reversed this position, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association.3t

The Association, which had a membership of nearly two hundred fire
insurance companies and twenty-seven individuals, was charged with price
fixing under section 1 and monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 32 The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the district court, which had sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground
that the business of insurance was not commerce, either interstate or intra33
state.
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was intended to apply to the fire insurance business. 34 In the future, the business
of insurance would be considered interstate commerce.
Within nine months of the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, Congress
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.3 5 The Act provided that the regulation and taxation of the insurance industry would be left to the states, but
that federal antitrust legislation 36 would apply to the extent that state legislation did not. 37 However, an exception was made for acts or agreements of
boycott, coercion or intimidation.38 In these areas alone, the Sherman Act
would continue to apply.
More than twenty years elapsed before the Supreme Court began to
narrow the sweeping language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In SEC v.
National Securities, Inc.,39 an injunction was sought to invalidate and unwind
a merger of insurance companies.
The Arizona insurance commissioner, believing he possessed the requisite regulatory authority, approved the merger. Despite the fact that an Arizona statute conferred upon the commissioner the authority to approve or
disapprove mergers, the Court held that the "business of insurance" did not
include the power to investigate and regulate mergers. 4° The Court stated
that the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to return to the states
the status quo enjoyed by them prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters decision. As the states never possessed the authority to regulate mergers, they
4
did not obtain it under the Act. '
30. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. N.Y., 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 410 (1870); Liverpool & London Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870);
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
31. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
33. 322 U.S. at 536.
34. Id. at 539.
35.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20,

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at § 1012(b).
Id.

5).
Id. at § 1013(b).
393 U.S. 453 (1969).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 459.

§§

1-
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In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that the Securities and
Exchange Commission had the authority to regulate securities issues involving insurance companies, for such matters were not part of the insurance
business. The Court went further and itemized the matters properly within
the "business of insurance." The list included the fixing of rates, the selling
and advertising of policies, and the licensing of companies and their
agents. 4 2 Also included was the relationship between the insurer and the
insured, the type of policy that could be issued, and its reliability, interpreta43
tion and enforcement.
The power of the states to regulate the relationship between insurer and
insured, as set forth in NationalSecuritiS 4 4 was significantly eroded in St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry.4 5 Plaintiffs, a group of physicians,
brought a class action under section 1 of the Sherman Act 46 alleging a boycott by four insurance companies. They claimed that three of the companies
them to submit to
refused to sell them malpractice insurance, so as to'4compel
"new ground rules of coverage set by the fourth." 7
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss,4 8 holding that
the boycott exemption to the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not include the
insurer-insured relationship. The First Circuit reversed, 49 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, in order to resolve the conflicting interpretations of
section 3(b) of the Act that had been adopted by several circuits. 50
The Court held that the scope of section 3(b) was not limited to boycotts of competing insurance companies or agents, but included any act
amounting to a 1boycott, including a boycott by insurance companies against
5
their insureds.
In view of the Court's extension of the boycott to include any such
act,52 it becomes apparent that Mac, an adjuster, would also be protected by
section 3(b), had he been found to be within the business of insurance.
C.

The Case: Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.
1. Facts

This antitrust action was brought in the district court by Mac Adjustment, Inc., and B. J. Gosting, its president. 53 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. and Property Loss Research Bureau,
acted in concert to induce insurance companies not to use Mac's independ42. Id. at 460.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
46. Id. at 533.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 536.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 536 n. 5.
51. Id. at 554.
52. Id. at 550.
53. 597 F.2d at 1320, Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., No. CIV76-0848-E, mem. op. at 2 n. I (W.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 1977).
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ent adjusting service. 54 Defendants were further alleged to have accomplished this by falsely representing that Mac was too generous in adjusting
losses. 55 Shortly after defendants made the allegedly false statements, plaintiff's business began to decline. This decline continued for about three years,
56
until the business was almost totally destroyed.
Mac and Gosting thereafter brought suit, claiming that they had been
injured as a result of a conspiracy, a section 1 Sherman Act violation. 57 Following an th imine hearing conducted solely for the purpose of eliciting evidence of Mac's engagement in interstate commerce, 58 the district court
decided that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter. The decision was
reached because the court found that interstate commerce had not been substantially affected.
The trial court's holding that it did not have the requisite jurisdiction
because the acts that injured Mac did not have an effect on interstate commerce was appealed; however, its companion holding that these acts were
59
not in the business of insurance was not.
The Tenth Circuit subsequently held that as a consequence of the district court holding that plaintiffs were not in the business of insurance, they
would now be required to establish that they were, a conclusion apparently
based on the court's misperception of the holding in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters,60 and of the district court holding itself, for the district
court did not hold that Mac was not engaged in interstate commerce.
The judgment of the district court was properly reversed, but the case
was remanded for the wrong reason-so that plaintiffs could prove at trial
that they were indeed engaged in interstate commerce. 6 1 Subsequently, de62
fendants petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
2.

Analysis

The progress of this case through the courts may almost be likened to a
comedy of errors. The first error was that of the trial court, in its granting of
summary judgment. As Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, indicated, ".

.

. summary judgment is appropriate if.

.

.there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact. .
"63 In addition, the Supreme Court's caution that summary judgment should be rarely granted in antitrust matters64
54. Id. at 1319.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. 15 U.S.C. § 1 declares illegal: "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states .... "
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), establishes a private treble damage action
for conduct proscribed by antitrust statutes.
58. 597 F.2d at 1318.
59. Id. at 1321.
60. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Court held that the sale of fire insurance policies was a

transaction within interstate commerce.
61. 597 F.2d at 1322.
62. Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cases
62,599 (petition for certiorari, U.S. S. Ct. No. 79-311).
63. 597 F.2d at 1322.
64. Id.; Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1961).
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was properly applied by the Tenth Circuit in Mac. Thus, the district court
erred in holding that the injuries complained of had no impact on interstate
commerce. This contention should have been considered after trial, not following a limited pretrial hearing. Yet, the trial court was correct in looking
at the impact of defendants' activities on interstate commerce rather than
65
Mac's engagement therein.
It is more difficult to ascertain the propriety of the district court's finding that the activities of defendants were not in the "business of insurance"
as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In view of the recent strictures
placed on this definition by the Supreme Court, 66 this holding is probably
correct.
The problem with the decision was created not by the district court, but
by the Tenth Circuit because of its interpretation of the district court's holding. After determining that the district court had found Mac not to be
within the business of insurance, 6 7 the Tenth Circuit held that it was now
necessary for Mac to show that it was, in order to satisfy the interstate commerce requirements of the Sherman Act. 68
Inasmuch as there is ample precedent 69 to justify a holding that the
injured party in a boycott action need not prove his engagement in interstate
commerce, based on the doctrine of per se illegality, which allows the presumption of public injury, the Tenth Circuit created an unnecessary burden
for plaintiffs by equating the business of insurance with interstate commerce.
In view of the fact that Mac's activities were found not to be within the
business of insurance, the court could have proceeded directly to Klor's and
Radiant Burners, and considered the vital issue of the illegality of defendant's
actions.
Of course, had Mac been found to be in the business of insurance, recovery under the Sherman Act would not have been precluded, in view of
the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 70 However, the
Tenth Circuit appears to have placed Mac in a losing position, despite
whatever finding the district court might reach on remand.
Notwithstanding the fact that the case was remanded on such narrow
and faulty grounds that defendants were almost certain to prevail, 7' defend65. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1945).
66. Stgmeral'y Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) in
which the Court held that agreements between insurors and pharmacies were not within the
business of insurance. The Court further held that references to the meaning of the "business of
insurance" in the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act strongly suggest that Congress understood the business of insurance to be the underwringand spreading of risk. Seealso

Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 440 U.S. 942 (1979) in which the D.C. Circuit's
holding that agreements between automobile casualty insurors and automobile repair shops
were within the business of insurance was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for
further consideration in the light of Group Lift.
67. 597 F.2d at 1321.
68. Id. at 1321-22.
69. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
70. 15 U.S.C. §.1013(b) (1976).
71. 597 F.2d at 1321-22.
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ants petitioned for certiorari on August 27, 1979.72 Perhaps they are attempting to postpone the day when plaintiffs or the court will discover that
Klor's is directly on point.
Both plaintiffs and defendants in their briefs appear to have avoided the
real issue in this case. In their petition for certiorari defendants questioned
the propriety of the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court.
Their main question, however, asked "[w]hether the plaintiff in a Sherman
antitrust case must show, in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment
which challenges only the jurisdictional predicate of plaintiff's action, the
existence of a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 73 Plaintiff, in its response, asked the Court to
deny certiorari because in its view the decision of the Tenth Circuit was
74
proper.
It is noteworthy that plaintiff apparently was not concerned with the
limited question to be decided on remand. Nor did plaintiff raise the question of the applicability of the doctrine of per se illegality to the instant case.
Because the request for certiorari was based upon such a narrow issue, it
would appear that no question of sufficient import has been raised which
would justify its being granted. If so, the practitioner in the Tenth Circuit
may have to wait a bit longer for the day when the Circuit's conception of
the juridictional requirements for the plaintiff injured by a per se Sherman
Act violation is subject to question.
D.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit's holding in Mac places a hurdle in the path of the
private plaintiff who is injured by a violation of the antitrust statutes at a
time when the general trend is to eliminate such restraints. In GulfOil Corp.
v. Copp Pav'ng Co., 75 the Supreme Court held that the private plaintiff who
brings an action under the Sherman Act need not himself be "within the
flow of interstate commerce, ' 76 while the plaintiff who brings his action
under the Clayton Act 77 or the Robinson-Patman Act 78 must be. 79 Inas-

much as Mac alleged a Sherman Act violation, the Supreme Court's holding
in Copp would appear to relieve it of the burden of showing that it is engaged
in interstate commerce.
The Court in Copp further held that for the private plaintiff to sustain
his burden of proof he had to show that the effect on interstate commerce
was both substantial and adverse.8° However, in Hospital Building Co. v.
72. Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cases
62,599 (petition for certiorari, U.S. S. Ct. No. 79-311).
73. Brief for petitioners at 2.
74. Brief for respondents at 7.
75. 419 U.S. 187 (1974).
76. Id. at 195.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1976).

78. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
79. 419 U.S. at 195.
80. Id.
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Trustees of Rex Hospa'al,8 1 the Court undertook to define these terms, with the
result of significantly relaxing the requirements for the plaintiff. Thus, a
substantial effect on interstate commerce was found, although plaintiff could
not show any effect on market prices. The required nexus with interstate
commerce was satisfied because plaintiff hospital bought supplies from out of
state distributors, received some patients from other states, obtained revenues from other states, financed its expansion by borrowing from out of state
lenders, possessed an out of state parent company, and most important for
the purpose of this comment, received revenues from out of state insurance
companies. 8 2 If similar guidelines had been applied in Mac, the necessary
effect on interstate commerce should not have been difficult to establish.
The Tenth Circuit included both Copp and Rex Hospital in its opinion in
Mac, and correctly recognized that they were useful indicators of "what is
necessary in order to satisfy the commerce requirement of the Sherman
Act"'8 3 but failed to distinguish between a private plaintiff's being engaged in
interstate commerce and his injury having a substantial efect on such commerce. Because Mac could not meet the first requirement, but would have
an excellent chance of meeting the second, the Tenth Circuit, by using Copp
and Rex Hospital in the wrong context severely limited Mac's chances of
eventual recovery.
Further evidence of the current trend toward reducing jurisdictional requirements for the private antitrust plaintiff can be detected in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,8 4 where plaintiffs were a married couple who purchased a
home. They brought an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act 8 5 alleging that the minimum fee schedule of the Bar violated the Act. The essence
of the charge was that the Bar was engaged in price fixing, a Sherman Act
violation that, like the boycott, is per se illegal. Plaintiffs' engagement in
interstate commerce was properly never at issue.
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barrg,8 6 plaintiffs, a group of
physicians, sued four insurance companies who boycotted them by attempting to compel them to purchase a new type of coverage offered by one of the
companies. Based on the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act,8 7 the plaintiffs prevailed. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, never
referred to plaintiffs' engagement in interstate commerce.
Had the Tenth Circuit followed the current trend in this area, the question of Mac's engagement in interstate commerce would not have been
raised. The McCarran-Ferguson Act boycott exception88 apparently was
the red herring in the Mac case, and it drew the court's attention from the
real issue: whether a full trial was required in order to give Mac the necessary opportunity to show that defendants' acts met the Sherman Act require81. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
82. Id. at 741.
83. 597 F.2d at 1322.
84. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
86. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
88. Id.
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ments, i.e., that they were a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade,8 9 and that their effect was to monopolize or attempt to monopolize
9°
any part of interstate commerce.
9
Relying on this language, the Supreme Court in Klor's ' found that the
business of the defendants, 1'e., the "business of manufacturing, distributing
and selling household applainces" 9 2 was in interstate commerce and provided a sufficient nexus with that commerce so as to permit Klor's to recover.

The effect of Klor's, where the Court declared the boycott to be per se
illegal, was to dispense with the requirement that plaintiff prove public injury. Because of the seriousness of the violation, public injury would be presumed. All the plaintiff in a boycott case had to show was some relationship
with interstate commerce.
The idea, enunciated first in Klor's, that the victim of a boycott need
not himself be engaged in interstate commerce, should have been applied
with equal force to Mac. Had Klor's never been decided, the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Mac would have been correct, but in the light of Klor's and the
cases following it, it appears that the Tenth Circuit should reevaluate its
position.
The effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Mac is to preclude recovery
for antitrust injury when the plaintiff's business is essentially local in nature,
and where the volume of business is small. A careful analysis of the economics of the holding leads inescapably to the conclusion that it is this very type
of plaintiff who is most in need of the protection of the antitrust laws.
Justice Jackson, in outlining the proper role of the court in antitrust
93
matters in International Salt Co. v. United States observed: "Under the law,
agreements are forbidden which 'tend to create a monopoly,' and it is immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at
full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the
'94
direction of the movement."
The approach postulated by Justice Jackson was utilized by the
Supreme Court in Klor's, and it is relied on by courts today as the accepted
view. Had the Tenth Circuit accepted this approach, and relied on the principle of per se illegality, as it was applied to the boycott in Klor's, the results
in Mac should have been different.
It is possible that, on remand, the required nexus with interstate commerce still could not have been established. While remand for the correct
reason still would not have assured a victory for the plaintiff, certainly the
89.
90.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).

91. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
92. Id. at 209.

93. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
94. Id. at 396.
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burden on Mac and the future private plaintiff who brings his case in the
Tenth Circuit's domain would have been a lighter one.
Petitionfor certiorariwas denied on October 29, 1979.95
Pamela E Schenkein

95. 100 S. Ct. 271 (1979).

